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ABSTRACT
Machine Learning (ML) is widely used for predictive tasks in
numerous important applications—most successfully, in the
context of collaborative learning, where a plurality of entities
contribute their own datasets to jointly deduce global ML
models. Despite its efficacy, this new learning paradigm fails
to encompass critical application domains, such as health-
care and security analytics, that involve learning over highly
sensitive data, wherein privacy risks limit entities to individ-
ually deduce local models using solely their own datasets.
In this work, we present the first comprehensive study for
privacy-preserving collaborative hierarchical clustering, over-
all featuring scalable cryptographic protocols that allow two
parties to safely perform cluster analysis over their combined
sensitive datasets. For this problem at hand, we introduce
a formal security notion that achieves the required balance
between intended accuracy and privacy, and present a class
of two-party hierarchical clustering protocols that guaran-
tee strong privacy protection, provable in our new security
model. Crucially, our solution employs modular design and
judicious use of cryptography to achieve high degrees of effi-
ciency and extensibility. Specifically, we extend our core pro-
tocol to obtain two secure variants that significantly improve
performance, an optimized variant for single-linkage cluster-
ing and a scalable approximate variant. Finally, we provide
a prototype implementation of our approach and experimen-
tally evaluate its feasibility and efficiency on synthetic and
real datasets, obtaining encouraging results. For example,
end-to-end execution of our secure approximate protocol,
over 1M 10-dimensional records, completes in 35sec, trans-
ferring only 896KB and achieving 97.09% accuracy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Big-data analytics is an ubiquitous practice with a notice-
able impact on our lives. Our digital interactions produce
massive amounts of data that are processed in order to dis-
cover unknown patterns or correlations, which, in turn, are
used to draw safe conclusions or make informed decisions.
At the core of this lies Machine Learning (ML) for devising
complex data models and predictive algorithms that provide
hidden insights and automated actions, while optimizing
certain objectives. Example applications successfully em-
ploying ML frameworks include, among others, market fore-
cast, service personalization, speech/face recognition, au-
tonomous driving, health diagnostics and security analytics.
Of course, data analysis is only as good as the analyzed
data, but this goes beyond the need to properly inspect,
cleanse or transform high-fidelity data prior to its modeling.
In most learning domains, analyzing “big data” is of
twofold semantics: volume and variety. First, the larger the
dataset available to an ML algorithm, the better its learning
accuracy, as irregularities due to outliers fade faster away.
Indeed, scalability to large dataset sizes is very important,
especially so in unsupervised learning, where model infer-
ence uses unlabelled observations (evading points of satura-
tion, encountered in supervised learning, where new training
sets improve accuracy only marginally). Also, the more var-
ied the collected data, the more elaborate its analysis, as
degradation due to noise reduces and domain coverage in-
creases. Indeed, for a given learning objective, say classifica-
tion or anomaly detection, combining more datasets of simi-
lar type but different origin, enables discovery of more com-
plex, or interesting, hidden structures and of richer associa-
tion rules (correlation or causality) among data attributes.
So, ML models improve their predictive power when they
are globally built over multiple datasets owned and con-
tributed by different entities, in what is termed collaborative
learning—and widely considered as the golden standard [78].
Privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering. Several
learning tasks of interest, across a variety of application do-
mains, such as healthcare or security analytics, demand de-
riving accurate ML models over highly sensitive data—e.g.,
personal, proprietary, customer, or other types of data that
induce liability risks. By default, since collaborative learn-
ing inherently implies some form of data sharing, entities
in possession of such confidential datasets are left with no
other option than simply running their own local models,
severely impacting the efficacy of the learning task at hand.
Thus, in the context of data analytics, privacy risks are the
main impediment to collaboratively learning richer models
over large volumes of varied, individually contributed, data.
The security and database community has recently em-
braced the powerful concept of Privacy-preserving Collabo-
rative Learning (PCL), the premise being that effective ana-
lytics over sensitive data is feasible by building global models
in ways that protect privacy. This is typically achieved by
applying Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) or Differ-
ential Privacy (DP) to data analytics, so that learning occurs
over encrypted or sanitized data.1 One notable example is
the recent framework for privacy-preserving federated learn-
ing [14], where model parameters are aggregated and shared
by multiple clients to generate a global model. Existing work
on PCL almost exclusively addresses supervised rather than
1
Yet, neither approach is directly applicable to large-scale PCL: Run-
ning crypto-heavy ML tasks over large datasets impairs scalability
and learning over sanitized data may allow leakage (e.g., [34,45,76]).
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unsupervised learning tasks (with a few exceptions such as
k-means clustering). As unsupervised learning is a prevalent
learning paradigm, the design of supporting ML protocols
that promote collaboration, accuracy, and privacy, is vital.
In this paper, we present the first comprehensive study for
privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering, overall contribut-
ing scalable cryptographic protocols that allow two parties
to privately learn a model for the joint clusters of their com-
bined sensitive datasets. Importantly, our protocols are de-
signed and analyzed in a new security model that is nec-
essary for a complete and formal treatment of the problem
at hand. In contrast, prior work in this space has proposed
crypto-assisted protocols (e.g., [22, 46, 47]) but without of-
fering any rigorous security definitions or analysis.
Motivating applications. Hierarchical clustering is a
class of unsupervised learning methods that build a hierar-
chy of clusters over an input dataset, typically in bottom-up
fashion. Clusters are initialized to each contain a single in-
put point and are iteratively merged in pairs, according to
a linkage metric that measures clusters’ closeness based on
their contained points. Here, unlike other clustering meth-
ods (k-means or spectral clustering), different distance met-
rics can define cluster linkage (e.g., nearest neighbor and
diameter for single and complete linkage, respectively) and
flexible conditions on these metrics can determine when
merging ends. The final output is a dendrogram with all
formed clusters and their merging history. This richer clus-
tering type is widely used in practice, often in areas where
the need for scalable PCL solutions is profound.
In healthcare, for instance, hierarchical clustering allows
researchers, clinicians and policy makers to process medical
data in order to discover useful correlations that can improve
health practices—e.g., discover similar groups of genes [29],
patient groups most in need of targeted intervention [62,
87], and changes in healthcare costs as a result of specific
treatment [55]. To be of any predictive value, such analyzed
data contains sensitive information (e.g., patient records,
gene information, or PII) that must be protected, also due
to legislations such as HIPPA in US or GDPR in EU.
Also, in security analytics, hierarchical clustering allows
enterprise security personnel to process log data on net-
work/users activity in order to discover suspicious or mali-
cious events—e.g., detect botnets [41], malicious traffic [61],
compromised accounts [17], or malware [12]. To be of any
forensics value, again, such analyzed data contains sensitive
information (e.g., employee/customer data, enterprise secu-
rity posture, defense practices, etc.) that must be protected,
also due to industrial regulations or for reduced liability.
As such, without privacy-protection provisions in place
for collaborative learning, entities are restricted to apply hi-
erarchical clustering solely on their own private datasets to
learn local clusters, thus confined in accuracy and effective-
ness. For instance, a clinical-trial analysis over patients of
one hospital may introduce bias on geographic population,
or network inspection of one enterprise may miss crusial in-
sight from recent attacks against other enterprises.
In contrast, our treatment of cluster analysis as a PCL
instance is a solid step towards richer classification. Our
privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering protocols incen-
tivize individuals to contribute their private datasets for
joint cluster analysis over larger and more varied data col-
lections, to get in return better-quality results. For instance,
hospitals can jointly cluster medical data extracted from
their combined patient records, to provide better treatment
and enterprises can jointly cluster threat indicators collected
from their combined security monitoring tools, to present
timely and stronger defenses against advanced attacks.2 At
all times, data owners protect the confidentiality of their pri-
vate data and remain compliant with current regulations.
Challenges and insights. Devising provably-secure proto-
cols for privacy-preserving collaborative hierarchical cluster-
ing entails a few technical challenges, as we briefly discuss.
The first challenge relates to specifying rigorously the ex-
act secure functionality that such protocols must achieve.
A two-party privacy-preserving protocol guarantees that no
party learns anything about the input of the other party, ex-
cept what can be inferred after parties learn the output. But
what if the learned output fully reveals the provided input?
Indeed, since its output dendrogram includes or implies its
input, hierarchical clustering is bound to offer no privacy,
when done collaboratively! To overcome this obstacle, we
consider collaborative hierarchical clustering as an appropri-
ate refinement of its legacy version that meaningfully redacts
the joint output—sufficiently enough, to allow the needed
input privacy protection, but minimally so, to preserve the
learning utility. In particular, we introduce a security notion
that is based on point-agnostic dendrograms, which explicitly
capture only the merging history of the formed joint clusters
and useful statistics thereof, and thus ideally balances the
intended accuracy against the achieved privacy. We present
the first such formal problem specification in Section 3.
Other challenges relate to realizing securely and efficiently
this new PCL functionality. Hierarchical clustering over n
points is already computation-heavy, incurring O(n3) cost.
As such, approximation algorithms for clustering, such as
CURE [42], is the de facto practical means to achieve scal-
ability to massive data amounts, but incorporating both
approximate and private computation is far than obvious,
as complications arise in rigorously defining security [32].
Finally, standard tools for secure two-party computation,
based on Yao’s garbled circuits [89], result in large com-
munication, while use of fully homomorphic encryption [36]
is still prohibitively costly, rendering the design of scalable
PCL protocols for hierarchical clustering a difficult task. We
address such challenges via some unique insights which en-
able us to devise protocols that achieve our desiderata.
First, in Section 4, we employ a modular design approach
and use cryptography judiciously by devising our main con-
struction as a mixed protocol (e.g., [23,43,52]). We carefully
decompose our refined hierarchical clustering into building
blocks and then explore performance trade-offs in our design
space, specified by how such building blocks are defined and
implemented, to finally select a combination that achieves
fast computation and low bandwidth usage, wherein we con-
veniently use garbled circuits [89] for cluster merging, but
additive homomorphic encryption [66] for cluster encoding.
In Section 5, we analyze our main protocol with respect
to performance, generality and security and present an op-
timized variant of O(n2) cost for the case of single linkage.
In Section 6, we further optimize our main protocol, by
seamlessly integrating the CURE method [42] for approxi-
mate clustering into our design, to get the hard-to-achieve
2
Consistently with current trends in healthcare and security analytics
towards collaborative learning; e.g., AI-based prediction systems in
clinical trials [2] and threat-intelligence sharing platforms [5,6,24,31].
2
best-of-two-worlds quality of highly-scalable and strongly-
private protocols. Our modular design approach provides
provably-secure approximate variants that exhibit different
trade-offs between efficiency and accuracy without any leak-
age due to approximation. We view the integration of cryp-
tography with approximate learning as a promising PCL
approach for large performance gain at small accuracy loss.
In Section 7, we report results from a comprehensive ex-
perimental evaluation of our protocols, on synthetic and real
data, that confirm their feasibility and practicality. For ex-
ample, end-to-end execution of our private protocol for ap-
proximate single-linkage cluster analysis of 1M 10-d records,
achieves 97.09% accuracy at very modest overheads: namely,
running time of 35sec and bandwidth usage of 896KB.
Finally, we provide preliminaries, an overview of related
work and our conclusion in Sections 2, 8 and 9. Extra tech-
nical details and security proofs appear in the Appendix.
Summary of contributions. Overall, in this work:
• We provide a formal definition and design provably
secure two-party protocols for privacy-preserving hier-
archical clustering for single or complete linkage.
• We present an optimized protocol for the case of sin-
gle linkage that significantly improves the associated
computational and communication costs.
• We propose a novel integration of common approxi-
mate clustering methods into our protocols to get vari-
ants that achieve both scalability and strong privacy.
• We validate the efficiency and practicality of our pro-
tocols via extensive experimentation over a prototype
implementation using both synthetic and real datasets.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We first provide background information about the class
of hierarchical-clustering methods, adversarial model and
cryptographic tools that are considered in our work.
HC cluster analysis. Hierarchical clustering (HC) is an
unsupervised learning method used to group data objects
into similarity clusters, wherein objects form a cluster if they
are close to each other according to a well-defined criterion.
Specifically, for fixed positive integers d, l, let D = {vi|vi ∈
Xd}ni=1 be an unlabeled indexed dataset of n d-dimensional
points, over domain X = {0, . . . , 2l − 1} (w.l.o.g. the
non-negative integers mod 2l, e.g., for l = 32). Over
pairs x, y ∈ D of points, point distance is measured using
the standard square Euclidian distance metric dist(x, y) =∑d
j=1(xj − yj)2. Over pairs X,Y ⊆ D of sets of points,
set closeness is measured using a linkage distance metric
δ(X,Y ), as a function of the cross-set distances of points
contained in X, Y . The most commonly used linkage dis-
tances are the single linkage (or nearest neighbor) defined
as δ(X,Y ) = minx∈X,y∈Y dist(x, y), and the complete linkage
(or diameter) defined as δ(X,Y ) = maxx∈X,y∈Y dist(x, y).
Standard HC methods fall into the agglomerative type,
using set closeness to form clusters in a bottom-up fashion,
generally described by the algorithm HCAlg in Figure 1.
Algorithm HCAlg receives as input an n-point dataset D
and groups its points into a total of `t ≤ n target clusters, by
iteratively merging pairs of closest clusters into their union.
Conveniently, the merging history is stored (redundantly) in
a dendrogram T , that is, a forest of clusters of n−`t+1 levels,
where siblings correspond to merged clusters and levels to
dataset partitions, build level-by-level upwards as follows:
Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm HCAlg
Input: Indexed set D = {vi}ni=1, termination parameter t
Output: Dendrogram T , clusters C(T ), metadata M(T )
Parameters: Linkage distance δ(·, ·), termination condition
End(·, ·), cluster statistics set M ⊇ {rep(·), size(·)}
[Initially, at level n]
1. Initialize dendrogram T : For each i = 1, . . . , n:
– Create node ui as the ith left-most leaf in T .
– Set C(ui) = {vi} as the singleton cluster of ui.
– Compute M(ui) = {m(vi)|m ∈M} as statistics of ui.
2. Set up linkages: Compute linkages of all pairs of singleton
clusters as a dictionary D, where value C(ui), C(uj) is keyed
under δ(C(ui), C(uj)), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
[Iteratively, at level i = n, . . . , `t − 1]
1. Update T : If Ni is the set of nodes in T at level i:
– Find in D the min-linkage pair (u, u′) of nodes in Ni,
breaking ties using a fixed rule over leaf-node indices.
– Create node w ∈ Ni−1 as parent of u and u′; set C(w) =
C(u) ∪ C(u′); for each other node u¯ ∈ Ni − {u, u′},
create node w¯ ∈ Ni−1 as parent of u¯; set C(w¯) = C(u¯).
– For each node wˆ ∈ Ni−1, compute M(wˆ).
2. Check termination: If End(T, t) == 1, terminate.
3. Update linkages: Compute linkage δ(C(w), C(w¯)), for
all w¯ ∈ Ni−1 − {w}, and consistently update dictionary D.
Figure 1: Agglomerative hierarchical clustering.
• Initially, each input point vi ∈ D forms a singleton
cluster {vi} as a leaf in T (at its lowest level n).
• Iteratively, the i root clusters (at top level i) form i−1
new root clusters in T (at higher level i− 1), with the
closest two merged into a union cluster as their parent,
and each other cluster copied to level i−1 as its parent.
When a new level of `t target clusters is reached, HCAlg
halts and outputs T . The exact value of `t ∈ [1 : n] is de-
termined during execution via a predefined condition End
checked over the current state T and a termination param-
eter t provided as additional input. This allows for flexible
termination conditions, such as stopping when inter-cluster
distance drops below an accuracy threshold specified by t,
or simply when exactly `t = t target clusters are formed.
Typically, the dendrogram T is augmented to store
some associated cluster metadata, by keeping, after any
union/copy cluster is formed, some useful statistics over its
contained points. Common such statistics for cluster C is its
size size(C) = |C| and representative value rep(C), usually
defined as its centroid (i.e., a certain type of average) point.
Overall, for a set M of cluster statistics of interest and
specified linkage distance and termination condition, HCAlg
is viewed to operate on indexed dataset D = {vi}ni=1 and re-
turn an M-augmented dendrogram T , comprised of: (1) the
forest structure of dendrogram T , specifying the full merging
history of input points into formed clusters (from n single-
tons to `t target ones); (2) the cluster set C(T ); and (3)
themetadata set M(T ) associated with (clusters in) T . As-
suming that HCAlg employs a fixed tie-breaking method in
merging clusters, its execution is deterministic.
Secure computation and threat model. We consider
the standard setting for private two-party computation,
where two parties wishing to evaluate function f(·, ·) on
their individual, private inputs x1, x2, engage in an interac-
tive cryptographic protocol that upon termination returns to
each party the common output y = f(x1, x2). Protocol se-
curity has this semantics: Subject to certain computational
assumptions and certain types of misbehavior during proto-
col execution, no party learns anything about the input of
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the other party, other than what can be inferred by its own
input xi and the learned result y. In this context, we study
privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering in the semi-honest
adversarial model which assumes that parties are honest,
but curious: They will follow the prescribed protocol but
also seek to infer information about the input of the other
party, by examining the transcript of exchanged messages.
Although, in practice, parties may choose to be malicious,
by also deviating from the prescribed protocol, the semi-
honest adversarial model still has its merits, especially in
the studied PCL setting.3 First, it provides the essential
privacy protection for any privacy-aware party to enter the
joint computation. It can also “scale up:” By (significantly)
trading off efficiency, security can be (perfectly) hardened
via known generic techniques for compiling protocols secure
in this model into counterparts secure against malicious par-
ties. Finally, semi-honest attackers seem to adequately cap-
ture the expected profile of PCL participants, namely, those
who benefit by joining a federation to collaboratively learn,
and do not risk being excluded due to detected misbehavior.
Garbled Circuits. As one of the most widely used tools
for two-party secure computation, a Garbled Circuit (GC)
protocol enables two parties to evaluate a boolean circuit on
their joint inputs such that each party learns nothing about
the other party’s input, other than what can be inferred by
the computed output. This is achieved by having one party,
called the garbler, generate an encrypted truth table for each
gate in the circuit. The other party, the evaluator, can then
evaluate the circuit by sequentially decrypting these truth
tables in a way that preserves input privacy. In Appendix A,
we provide more details about the GC framework.
Homomorphic encryption. A main technique for private
computation involves carrying out certain operations over
data encrypted. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [36]
allows to evaluate arbitrary functions over encrypted values,
but its general-purpose usage remains impractical. Partially
homomorphic encryption supports only specific arithmetic
operations over ciphertexts, but allows for very efficient im-
plementations [66, 70]. We use Pailliers scheme for Addi-
tively Homomorphic Encryption (AHE) [66], summarized as
follows. For given security parameter λ, keys generated by
running (pk, sk) ← Gen(1λ) and a public RSA modulus N ,
the scheme encrypts (with public key pk) any message m in
the plaintext space ZN into a randomized ciphertext [m], en-
suring that decryption (with secret key sk) of any ciphertext
product [m] · [m′] mod N2 (computable without sk) results
in the plaintext sum m+m′ mod N . Thus, decrypting [m]k
mod N2 results in km mod N , and the ciphertext product
[m] · [0] results in a fresh randomized encryption of m. An
AHE scheme is said to be semantically secure, if no efficient
test can tell apart ciphertext [m] from random x
$←− ZN2 .
3. FORMAL PROBLEM SPECIFICATION
We introduce a rigorous model for studying private clus-
ter analysis, the first to provide formal specifications for
designing secure two-party protocols for this central PCL
problem. Importantly, we define security for a refined learn-
ing task that achieves a meaningful balance between the in-
tended accuracy and privacy—a necessary compromise for
the problem at hand to even be defined as a PCL instance!
3
Existing PCL are primarily in the semi-honest model; see Section 8.
We first formulate two-party privacy-preserving hierarchi-
cal clustering as a secure computation. Parties P1, P2 hold
independently owned datasets P , Q of points in Xd, and
wish to perform a collaborative HC-based cluster analysis
over the combined set D = P ∪Q. P1, P2 agree on the exact
specification fHC of this joint cluster analysis, as a function
of their individually contributed datasets that encompasses
all other parameters (e.g., for termination). Let Π be a two-
party protocol that correctly realizes fHC(·, ·): Run jointly
on inputs x1, x2, Π returns the common output fHC(x1, x2).
Thus, parties P1, P2 can learn cluster model fHC(P,Q) by
running protocol Π on their inputs P , Q, and as discussed,
Π is considered secure if its execution prevents an honest-
but-curious party from learning anything about the input of
the other party other than what the learned output implies.
Ideal functionality. We formalize this intuitive privacy
requirement via the standard two-party ideal/real world
paradigm [40] that first defines what one can best hope for.
Cluster analysis with perfect privacy is trivial in an ideal
world, where P1, P2 instantly hand-in their inputs x1, x2
to a trusted third party, called the ideal functionality fHC ,
that computes and announces fHC(x1, x2) (and explodes).
Above, the use of terms “perfect” and “ideal” is fully jus-
tified for no information about a private input is leaked dur-
ing the computation. Some information about x1 or x2 may
be inferred after the output is announced, by combining the
known x2 or x1 with the learned fHC(x1, x2): It is the inher-
ent price for collaboratively learning a non-trivial function.
In the real world, P1, P2 learn fHC(x1, x2) by interacting
in the joint execution of a protocol Π. We measure the pri-
vacy quality of Π against the ideal-world perfect privacy, dic-
tating that running Π is effectively equivalent to calling the
ideal functionality fHC . Informally, Π securely realizes fHC ,
if anything computable by an efficient semi-honest party Pi
in the real world, can be simulated by an efficient algorithm
(called the simulator Sim), acting as Pi in the ideal world;
i.e., Π leaks no information about a private input during
execution, subject to the price for learning fHC(x1, x2).
Refined cluster analysis. Next in line is the question:
Which ideal functionality fHC should we securely realize for
privacy-preserving collaborative cluster analysis?
Though tempting, equating fHC with the legacy algo-
rithm HCAlg (Figure 1), and thus learning a full-form aug-
mented dendrogram, slides us into a degeneracy. Assume
that fHC merely runs HCAlg on the combined indexed set
D = P ∪ Q = {dk}nk=1, n = |P | + |Q|.4 The learned model
is the dendrogram T along with its associated clusters C(T )
and metadata M(T ). But set C(T ) itself reveals the input
D; in this case, the price for collaborative learning is full
disclosure of sensitive data and nothing is to be protected!
Thus, in the PCL setting, we need a new definition of HC-
based cluster analysis that distills the full-form augmented
dendrogram {T,C(T ),M(T )} into a more refined, but still
useful, learned cluster model, so as to achieve the required
balance between the intended accuracy (that gives value to
cluster analysis) and privacy (that allows collaboration).
If allowing the ideal functionality fHC to return cluster
set C(T ) is one extreme that diminishes privacy, removing
the dendrogram T from the output—to learn only about its
associated information C(T ), M(T )—is another that dimin-
ishes accuracy. Indeed, if the dendrogram T , which captures
4
If P , Q are indexed, then D = Q‖P , or else a fixed ordering is used.
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Ideal Functionality f∗HC(·, ·)
Input: Sets P = {pi}n11 , Q = {qj}
n2
1
Output: Dendrogram T∗, metadata M∗ ⊇ {rep(·), size(·)}
Parameters: Linkage distance δ(·, ·), termination condition
End(·, t), cluster statistics set M , selection function S(·)
[Pre-processing] Form input of size n = n1 + n2 for HCAlg:
1. Set D = {dk}n1 s.t. dk = pk, if k ≤ n1, or else dk = qk−n1 .
2. Pick random permutation pi : [n]→ [n]; set D∗ = pi(D).
[HC Algorithm] Run HCAlg(D∗, t) w/ parameters δ, M , End.
[Post-processing] Redact output T∗, C(T∗), M(T∗) of HCAlg:
1. Set M∗ = ∅; ∀v ∈ T∗: if S(v) == 1, M∗ ←M∗ ∪ {M(v)}.
2. Return T∗, M∗.
Figure 2: Ideal functionality f∗HC for HC cluster analysis.
the full merging history of clusters in its forest structure, is
excluded from the output of fHC , a core feature in HC-
based cluster analysis is lost: Namely, the ability to gain
insights on how target clusters were formed, i.e., under what
hierarchies and in which order. This renders the resulted
analysis only as good as much simpler cluster analysis (e.g.,
k-means) that merely discovers pure similarity statistics of
target clusters. Since the motivation for studying collabora-
tive hierarchical clustering as a prominent and widely used
unsupervised learning task, in the first place, lies exactly
on its ability to discover such rich inter-cluster relations, we
need to keep the forest structure of T in the output of fHC .
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Avoiding the above two degenerate extremes suggests that
the learned model fHC(P,Q) should necessarily include the
cluster hierarchy T but not the clusters C(T ) themselves.
Yet, the obvious middle-point approach of learning model
fmHC(P,Q) = {T,M(T )} remains suboptimal in terms of pri-
vacy protections, as the learned output can still be strongly
correlated to exact input points. Indeed, given T and a
party’s own input, inferring points of the other party’s in-
put simply amounts to identifying singleton clusters, which
is generally possible by inspecting and correlating the (hard-
coded in HCAlg) indices in D with the metadata associated
to singletons (or their immediate neighbors). For instance,
if w is the parent of singleton u and cluster u′ in T , then P1
can infer input point C(u) of P2, either directly from output
M(u), if u is known to store none of its input points, or
indirectly from M(u′), M(w), if these output values imply a
value of M(u) that is consistent with none of its own inputs.
Point-agnostic dendrogram. Such considerations natu-
rally lead to a new goal: We seek to refine further, but min-
imally so, the middle-point model fmHC(P,Q) = {T,M(T )}
into an optimized model f∗HC(P,Q) = {T ∗,M∗(T )},
whereby no private input points directly leak to any of the
parties, after the output is announced. This quality is well-
defined, intuitive and useful: Unless the intended joint clus-
ter analysis explicitly copies some of input points to the out-
put, the learned model f∗HC(P,Q) should allow no party to
explicitly learn, that is, to deterministically deduce with cer-
tainty, any of the unknown input points of the other party.
Accordingly, we define the ideal functionality f∗HC for
collaborative hierarchical clustering as one that outputs a
point-agnostic augmented dendrogram, defined by merely
5
Cluster hierarchy is the power in HC learning, e.g., in health-
care, revealing useful causal factors that contribute to prevalence of
diseases [29] and, in biology, revealing useful relationships between
plants, animals and their habitat and ecological subsystems [39].
running algorithm HCAlg, subject to a twofold correction of
its provided input P , Q and returned full-form dendrogram:
• Pre-process input: Run HCAlg on indexed set D∗
that is a random permutation over the combined set
D = P ∪Q = {dk}nk=1 (indexed in any fixed manner).
• Post-process output: Return the output T ∗, C(T ∗),
M(T ∗) of HCAlg redacted as T ∗,M∗(T ∗) ⊂ M(T ∗),
including metadata of only a few safe clusters in T ∗.
Detailed in Figure 2, our ideal functionality f∗HC refines all
components of the ordinary dendrogram T , C(T ), M(T ):
Running HCAlg on the randomly permuted input D∗ (in-
stead of D) results in a new randomized forest structure T ∗
(instead of T ) and, although its associated sets of formed
clusters C(T ∗) and metadata M(T ∗) remain the same, the
learned model includes no elements from C(T ∗), but only
specific elements from M(T ∗), determined by a selection
function S(·) (that is hard-coded in f∗HC as a parameter
agreed upon among the parties). And such metadata is safe
to learn, in the sense that it does not directly leak any input
points, not deliberately learned as part of the analysis.
We propose the following two orthogonal strategies for
safe metadata selection for point-agnostic dendrograms:
• s-Merging selection: M(w) ∈ M(T ∗) if w is the
parent of u, u′ in T ∗ and |C(u)|, |C(u′)| > s: any non-
singleton cluster formed by merging two clusters, each
of size above an agreed threshold s > 0, is safe;
• Target selection: M(w) ∈M(T ∗) if w is root in T ∗:
any target cluster at level `t in T
∗ is safe.
Above, the first strategy ensures that no direct leakage of
private input points occurs by correlating statistics of thin
neighboring clusters; in particular, no cluster statistics are
learned for singletons or their parents (s = 1), thus elimi-
nating the type of leakage allowed by model fmHC(P,Q). The
second strategy ensures that only statistics of target clusters
are learned, that is, input points may be directed learned
only explicitly as part of the intended cluster analysis.
Overall, the resulted dendrogram is point-agnostic in the
sense that neither the forest structure of T ∗ nor the learned
metadata M(T ∗) can, alone or combined, unintentionally
reveal which singletons the points of a party are mapped to.
Indeed, since input points are randomly mapped to single-
tons, ties in cluster merging are also randomly broken, and
since no statistics are learned for singleton (or thin) clus-
ters, no party can deduce with certainty any of the other
party’s input points. Anything that can be possibly inferred
about a party’s private input corresponds to a probabilistic
meta-analysis that must necessarily encompass an unknown
distribution of this input and an unknown random permu-
tation used by f∗HC . This probabilistic inference is viewed
as the inherent price of collaborative cluster analysis.
The following security definition formally summarizes the
specification of privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering.
Definition 3.1. A two-party protocol Π, jointly run by
P1, P2 on respective inputs x1, x2 using individual random
tapes r1, r2 that result in incoming-message transcripts t1,
t2, is said to be secure for collaborative privacy-preserving
hierarchical clustering in the presence of static, semi-honest
adversaries, if it securely realizes the ideal functionality
f∗HC defined in Figure 2, by satisfying the following: For
i = 1, 2 and for any security parameter λ, there exists a
non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time simulator SimPi
so that SimPi(1
λ, xi, f
∗
HC(x1, x2)) ∼= viewAΠ
Pi
, {ri, ti}.
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4. MAIN CONSTRUCTION
We next present our main solution to the problem of two-
party privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering, namely a
cryptogrographic protocol PCA for Private Cluster Analysis
jointly performed between parties P1, P2, which securely re-
alizes the ideal functionality f∗HC , as formulated in Section 3.
General approach. Designing efficient privacy-preserving
protocols for complex learning tasks is technically challeng-
ing, and hierarchical clustering—an inherently iterative pro-
cess with cubic costs in its input size—bears no excep-
tion. Carrying out such an laborious task in its entirety
by computing over ciphertext (malleable in some operation-
complete encryption form, such as Yao’s GC or FHE), would
render our solution largely impractical, if not infeasible.
Instead, we resort to the design paradigm of mixed pro-
tocols, where a variety of task-specific cryptographic tools
are employed and securely combined to produce more effi-
cient solutions (e.g., [15,23,50,58,60]). Conceptually, we de-
compose joint hierarchical clustering into more elementary
tasks, devise tailored secure and efficient protocols for each
of these, and finally combine all security components into a
final protocol, in ways that minimize the cost in converting
data encoding between individual task-specific protocols.
By design, our protocol securely implements f∗HC in its
generic form, supporting any desired cluster-analysis config-
uration that the parties agree upon—through the specified
protocol parameters: linkage δ(·, ·), termination condition
End(·, t), cluster statistics set M , selection function S(·). Yet
for simplicity, in what follows (and in our experimental eval-
uation in Section 7) we consider the default configuration,
where M comprises only of the representatives and sizes of
t target clusters (i.e., using target selection with `t = t fixed
in advance). Also for clarity, we here consider complete link-
age over one-dimensional data, discussing optimizations for
single linkage and extensions to higher dimensions, along
with our protocol analysis, in Section 5. Finally, consistent
with our design approach, we follow a top-down protocol
presentation, introducing new components only as needed.
Protocol overview. Parties P1,P2 enter protocol PCA
having as private inputs their individual datasets P,Q of
n1, n2 points, n = n1 + n2, and as common input secu-
rity parameter λ, which specifies the strength of the used
cryptography, by fixing modulus N (with X ⊆ ZN ) and sta-
tistical parameter κ (as the size of used blinding terms).
After first establishing individual key pairs for employing
Paillier-based AHE encryption and exchanging public keys,
the parties jointly run sub-protocols PCA.Setup, PCA.Cluster
and PCA.Output, which comprise three main phases in our
protocol, in direct analogy to the three components of f∗HC .
In a setup phase, sub-protocol PCA.Setup builds the cryp-
tographic stage on which cluster analysis is performed by the
other two, by processing the input points into a secure repre-
sentation of singletons and their pairwise linkage distances.
This representation comprises of the n input points, viewed
as an input array I, and all pairwise distances among these
points, viewed as a n × n cluster distance matrix ∆. Here,
I,∆ are only virtual, corresponding to an early joint state of
P1,P2 that is actually secret-shared between them. Specifi-
cally, P1 holds an array L with exactly I’s elements but each
AHE-encrypted under P2’s secret key, and a n×n matrix R
with random blinding terms, whereas P2 holds (along with
its secret key) the matrix B = ∆ +R with blinded pairwise
cluster distances. Importantly, as f∗HC specifies, the joint
state {I,∆} is split only after I’s elements and ∆’s rows
and columns are randomly shuffled, with P1,P2 contributing
equally, but being not privy, to the exact shuffling used.
In a clustering phase, sub-protocol PCA.Cluster virtually
runs the ordinary hierarchical clustering algorithm HCAlg on
matrix ∆. In fact, P1,P2 process their individual states R,B
to iteratively merge singletons into target clusters, based on
inter-cluster distances in B−R = ∆. Each iteration merges
two clusters into a new one and involves three main tasks:
• Find pair: First, P1,P2 jointly find the closest-cluster
pair (i, j) = argMin(∆), i < j, to merge, i.e., the in-
dices in ∆ of the minimum inter-cluster distance Dij .
• Update linkages: Then, P1,P2 jointly update ∆ to
∆′ = B′ − R′ that reflects the new cluster distances
after pair (i, j) is merged, say, into cluster C = Ci∪Cj .
This entails computing (and then splitting via a fresh
blinding term) the distance δ(C,C′) between C and
each never-merged cluster C′, which simply equals to
the largest (or smallest) of δ(Ci, C
′) and δ(Cj , C′) (by
the associativity of the max (or min) operator).
• Record merging: Finally, P1,P2 record in ∆′ that
the new cluster C is formed by merging Ci and Cj .
In an output phase, sub-protocol PCA.Output simply pro-
cesses the final joint state {I,∆} to compute the output
merging history and metadata for all safe (target) clusters.
We stress that our protocol skeleton is purposely devised,
as above, not merely to achieve strong privacy protection,
but equally to allow for increased efficiency. The split-state
secure data representation along with the carefully crafted
modular design, are vital features for effectively adopting
the design framework of mixed protocols: By securely split-
ting the joint state {I,∆} into individual states {L,R}, B,
we can securely implement all protocol components that in-
volve (distance or metadata) computations over points us-
ing Paillier-based AHE, with the sole exception of the two
protocol components that involve using the max (or min)
operator, for which we can optimally use Yao’s GC. Conve-
niently, all protocol components required by the setup phase
to form the joint state {I,∆}, namely to construct, shuffle
and split {I,∆} into {L,R}, B, can also be securely im-
plemented by solely relying on the homomorphic property
of AHE-encrypted exchanged data. We next provide more
details on how each protocol component is implemented.
Hereafter, we assume that points are unambiguously
mapped into integers in ZN and that all homomorphic (resp.
plaintext) operations are reduced modulo N2 (resp. N).
We consistently denote the AHE-encrypted, under pk (resp.
pk′), plaintext d by [d] (resp. JdK) and the AHE-decrypted,
under any key, ciphertext c by 〈c〉. For simplicity, whenever
the context is clear, we redundantly denote each of the two
n × n matrices R, B (maintained by P1,P2) also by Σ. Fi-
nally, we denote the execution of a GC-based protocol GC,
jointly run by P1,P2 on private inputs I1, I2 to get private
outputs O1, O2, by (O1;O2)← GC(I1; I2).
Setup phase. P1,P2 set up their states in three rounds of
interaction, as shown in Algorithm 1, using only homomor-
phic operations over AHE-encrypted data and contributing
equally to the randomized state permutation and splitting.
Initially, P2 prepares, encrypts under its own key and
sends to P1, information related to its input set Q, which in-
cludes its encrypted points among other helper information
H, and their encrypted pairwise distances D (lines 1-4).
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Algorithm 1: PCA.Setup: Setup Phase
1 P2: %Create & send helper info
2 Compute matrix H: H1,i = JqiK, H2,i = J−2qiK, H3,i = Jq2i K
3 Compute matrix D: Di,j = Jdist(qi, qj)K i ∈ [1 : n2]
4 Send {H,D} to P1 i, j ∈ [1 : n2]
5 P1: %Blind points, linkages
6 Compute array S: Si = si, si
$←− {0, 1}κ i ∈ [1 : n]
7 Compute array L: Li = JpiK, if i ≤ n1; else Li = H1,i−n1
8 Blind L as: Li := Li · JSiK
9 Encrypt S as: Si := [Si]
10 Compute matrix R: Ri,j = ri,j , ri,j
$←− {0, 1}κ i, j ∈ [1 : n]
11 Compute matrix B: Bi,j = Jdist(pi, pj)K, if i, j ≤ n1;
12 Bi,j = Di−n1,j−n1 , if n1 < i, j; else Bi,j = Jp2i K ·Hpi2,j ·H3,j
13 Blind B as: Bij := Bij · JRi,jK
14 Encrypt R as: Ri,j := [Ri,j ]
15 Permute S, L, R and B via a random permutation pi1(n)
16 Send {S,L,R,B} to P2 %Send permuted & blinded data
17 P2: %Blind received data
18 Compute array S′: S′i = s
′
i, s
′
i
$←− {0, 1}κ i ∈ [1 : n]
19 Blind L as: Li := Li · JS′iK
20 Blind S as: Si := Si · [S′i]
21 Compute matrix R′: R′i,j = r
′
i,j , r
′
i,j
$←− {0, 1}κ i, j ∈ [1 : n]
22 Decrypt and re-blind matrix B: Bi,j = 〈Bi,j〉+ R′i,j
23 Blind R as: Ri,j := Ri,j · [R′i,j ]
24 Permute S, L and R via a random permutation pi2(n)
25 Send {S,L,R} to P1 %Send permuted points, blinding terms
26 P1: %Store permuted points & linkages’ blinding terms
27 Decrypt S as: Si := 〈Si〉 i ∈ [1 : n]
28 Unblind L as: Li := Li · JSiK−1
29 Decrypt R as: Ri,j := 〈Ri,j〉 i, j ∈ [1 : n]
Then, P1 is tasked to initialize the states L, R and B.
First, the list L of all encrypted (under pk′) points in P ∪Q
is created (by arranging the sets in some fixed ordering and
then concatenating Q after P ), and all points are further
blinded by random additive terms in S (lines 5-9). Simi-
larly, the matrix B of encrypted (also under pk′) pairwise
distances is computed (using the ordering induced by L to
arrange the points), and all distances are blinded by ran-
dom additive terms in S (lines 10-14). The computation of
square Euclidean distances across sets P,Q (line 12, using
also elements in H) and the blinding of L and B (lines 8,
13) are all performed in the ciphertext domain via the ho-
momorphic property of AHE encryption. All blinding terms
in S and R are then encrypted (each under pk, lines 9, 14)
and S, L, R and B are sent to P2, after their elements are
shuffled using a random permutation pi1 (line 15).
In the third round, P2 roughly performs the same pro-
cess, by further blinding the encrypted points in L and P1’s
encrypted blinding terms in S by random additive terms
in S′ (both in the ciphertext domain, lines 16-19) and also
blinding the encrypted distances in B and P1’s encrypted
blinding terms in R by random additive terms in R′ (the
former in the plaintext domain and the latter in the cipher-
text domain, lines 20-22). Similarly, the freshly blinded S,
L, R are sent to P1, after their elements are shuffled using a
random permutation pi2 (line 23). Finally, P1 decrypts the
mutually-contributed accumulated blinding terms in S and
R, and uses the recovered values in S to completely remove
the blinding terms from L (in the ciphertext domain, by the
properties of Paillier-based AHE-encryption, lines 24-27).
The end result is that the composite permutation pi2 ◦ pi1
looks completely random to both parties, while they have
securely split joint state {I,∆} into {L,R}, B, as intended.
Algorithm 2: PCA.Cluster: Clustering Phase
1 P1, P2:
2 Initialize merging history: Σi,i = (i,⊥) i ∈ [1 : n]
3 Initialize: ` = 0, `t = t
4 repeat
5 Jointly run (i, j; i, j)← ArgMin(R; B), i < j %Find pair
6 foreach k = 1, . . . , n, k 6= i, j do
7 if Σi,k 6=⊥ and Σj,k 6=⊥ then
8 P1: X
$←− {0, 1}κ %Pick new blinding term
9 P1, P2: Jointly run %Find re-blinded max linkage
(⊥;Y )← MaxDist(Ri,k, Rj,k, X;Bi,k, Bj,k)
10 P1: Set: Rik = X, Rki = X %Update linkages
11 P2: Set: Bik = Y , Bki = Y
12 Set: Σj,j := ((Σj,j , `), i), Σi,i := ((Σi,i,Σj,j , `),⊥)
13 Set: Σk,j =⊥, Σj,k =⊥ k ∈ [1 : n] \ {j}
14 Set: ` := `+ 1 %Record merging
15 until ` > `t;
Clustering phase. Once P1,P2 have set up their states,
they execute the hierarchical clustering iterative process, as
shown in Algorithm 2, operating solely on their individual
matrices R, B via two special-purpose protocol components
for secure comparison based on Yao’s garbled circuits (GC).
P1,P2 encode cluster information in the diagonal of their
matrix state Σ; initially, the i-th entry stores (i,⊥), denoting
the never-merged singleton of rank i (after the permutation).
At the start of each iteration, P1,P2 find which pair of
clusters must be merged by jointly running the GC-protocol
(i, j; i, j) ← ArgMin(R;B) (line 5): The parties contribute
their individual matrices R,B of blinding terms and blinded
linkages, to learn the indices (i, j) of the minimum value
Bi,j−Ri,j , with i < j by convention (since R,B are symmet-
ric matrices). The garbled circuit for ArgMin first removes
the blinding terms by computing D = B − R, compares all
values in D to find the minimum element Di,j = minx,yBx,y,
and returns to both parties the indices i, j.
Once pair (i, j) is known to P1,P2, they proceed to jointly
update the linkages (lines 7-12). For each cluster k in Σ, they
change its linkage to the newly merged cluster as the maxi-
mum between its linkages to clusters i, j, by jointly running
the GC-protocol (⊥;Y )← MaxDist(Ri,k, Rj,k, X;Bi,k, Bj,k)
(line 10): The parties contribute the two entries from their
individual matrices R,B that are needed for comparing the
linkages Bi,k −Ri,k, Bj,k −Rj,k between cluster k and clus-
ters i, j, and P2 learns the maximum value of the two but
blinded by the random blinding term X inputted by P1. The
garbled circuit for MaxDist simply returns to (only) P2 the
value max{Bi,k −Ri,k, Bj,k −Rj,k}+X.
In appendix B, we provide details on the exact implemen-
tation of GC-protocols ArgMin, MaxDist, which are common
in the literature for finding the min entry location in blinded
matrices [15,53,93] and max of secret-shared values [10,53].
Finally, at the end of iteration `, P1,P2 record information
about the merging of clusters i, j, i < j (lines 14-15): By
convention, the new cluster is stored at location i, by adding
the rank ` and the information stored at location j (updated
with a pointer to i), and by deleting all distances related to
cluster j. Overall, the full merging history is recorded.
Output phase. Once clustering is complete, P1, P2 com-
pute in two rounds of interaction, as shown in Algorithm 3,
the final common output, consisting of the merging history
and the representatives and sizes of the target clusters (or,
in general, any linear statistics of the safe clusters), using
only homomorphic operations over AHE-encrypted data.
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Algorithm 3: PCA.Output: Output Phase
1 P1: %Compute encrypted point averages
2 Initialize arrays E, J: Ei = Ji =⊥ i ∈ [1 : n]
3 foreach i = 1, . . . , n do
4 if Ri,i encodes a target cluster Ci then
5 Find the index set Ii of points in cluster Ci
6 Set Ei =
∏
j∈Ii Lj , Ji = |Ii|
7 Send {E,J} to P2
8 P2: %Compute point averages
9 Decrypt E as: Ei := 〈Ei〉 i ∈ [1 : n]
10 Send E to P1
11 P1, P2: %Return output
12 Output {Σi,i, Ei/|Ji|, |Ji|} i ∈ [1 : n]
First, P1 computes encrypted point averages in all target
clusters, by exploiting the homomorphic properties of AHE
(lines 1-7): Using the diagonal in matrix R, P1 first identifies
each (of t total) target cluster Ci and then finds the index set
Ii (over permuted input points pi2 ◦pi1(P ∪Q)) of the points
contained in Ci, to finally compute
∏
j∈Ii Lj =
∏
j∈IiJpjK.
The resulted t encrypted point averages and cluster sizes are
sent to P2, who returns to P1 the t plaintext point averages,
i.e.,
∑
j∈Ii pj =
∑
pj∈Ci pj for each Ci (lines 8-10). At this
point, both parties can form the common output (line 12).
5. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
We next analyze our main protocol, summarizing its prop-
erties with respect to performance, generality and security.
Efficiency. Asymptotically, our protocol for private cluster
analysis achieves optimal performance, as it incurs no extra
overheads to the performance costs associated with running
hierarchical clustering, other than performing more involved
primitive operations due to the use of cryptography. Indeed,
assuming that each cryptographic operation takes O(1) time
(i.e., ignoring its dependence on the security parameter λ),
the asymptotic overheads incurred on P1,P2, during execu-
tion of each phase of PCA, are as follows: In setup phase, the
cost overhead for each party is O(n2), primarily related to
the cryptographic operations needed to populate its individ-
ual state Σ. In clustering phase, each of the `t = O(n) total
iterations incurs costs proportional the complexity of run-
ning GC-based protocols ArgMin, MaxDist, where the cost of
garbling and evaluating a circuit C, with a total number of
wires |C|, is O(|C|). Thus, during the `-th iteration: Eval-
uating circuit ArgMin entails n2 − 2` comparisons of d2-bit
values (of cluster distances) and subtractions of κ-bit values
(of blinding terms), for a total size of O(κ(n2− `)); likewise,
evaluating circuit MaxDist entails a constant number of com-
parisons of κ-bit values and O(n) such circuits are evaluated
at round `; thus, the total cost during this phase is O(κn3)
for each party. In output phase, the cost is O(`t) = O(n) for
each party. Thus, the total running time for both parties is
O(κn3)—that is, the same as running ordinary hierarchical
clustering, multiplied by a statistical factor κ = O(λ).
Optimized single-linkage protocol OPT. As explained
in Section 4, our protocol exploits the associativity of op-
erator max to update the complete linkage between newly
formed clusters C and other clusters C′, as the max of the
linkages between C’s constituent clusters and C′, securely
realized via a GC-based GC-protocol (·; ·)← MaxDist(·; ·).
Similarly, single linkages can be supported trivially, by
updating inter-cluster distances between C and C′ as the
min of the distances between C’s constituent clusters and C′:
Line 10 in Algorithm 2 now has P1,P2 jointly run the GC-
protocol (⊥;Y ) ← MinDist(Ri,k, Rj,k, X;Bi,k, Bj,k) to split
the new distance ∆i,k = min{Bi,k − Ri,k, Bj,k − Rj,k} into
X, Y = ∆i,k +X, with no asymptotic changes in efficiency.
More generally, the skeleton of protocol PCA allows for ex-
tensions that support a wider class of linkage functions, such
as average or centroid linkage, by appropriately refining GC-
protocols ArgMin, MinDist—but still, at quadratic cost per
merged cluster and cubic total cost. Yet, our single-linkage
protocol can be optimized to process each new cluster in only
O(κn) time, for a reduced O(κn2) total running time, with
CG-protocol (j; j) ← ArgMin(X;Y ) now refined, on input
arrays X,Y , to return as common output the minimum-
value index j of Y −X, excluding any non-linkage values.
The main idea is to exploit the associativity of operator
min and that only minimum inter-cluster linkages relate to
single-linkage clustering, in order to find the closest-cluster
pair (i, j) in linear time, by looking up in an array ∆¯ = B¯−R¯
that keeps the minimum row-wise distances in ∆ = B−R.6.
Specifically, at the end of the setup phase, P1, P2 now also
jointly run (ji; ji)← ArgMin(Ri;Bi), i ∈ [1 : n], to learn the
minimum-linkage index ji of the ith row Bi − Ri of ∆ (ex-
cluding its ith location, as Bi,i, Ri,i store cluster i), and they
both initialize array J¯ as J¯i = ji, whereas P1 initializes array
R¯ as R¯i = Ri,ji and P2 array B¯ as B¯i = Bi,ji . Then, at the
start of each iteration in the clustering phase (line 5 in Algo-
rithm 2) and assuming that ⊥ = +∞, P1, P2 now jointly run
(i; i) ← ArgMin(R¯; B¯) to find the closest-cluster pair (i, j),
j = J¯i, in only O(κn) time. Conveniently, as soon as they
update linkages ∆i,k = ∆k,i, for some k 6= i, j (lines 9-12, as
Y −X with (⊥;Y )← MinDist(Ri,k, Rj,k, X;Bi,k, Bj,k)), P1,
P2 also update the joint state {B¯ − R¯, J¯} for updated row
m ∈ {i, k}: First, by jointly running (z; z)← ArgMin(Rˆ; Bˆ)
for arrays Rˆ = [X, R¯m], Bˆ = [Y, B¯m] of size 2, and then, if
z = 1, by setting R¯m = Rˆz, B¯m = Bˆz and J¯m = {i, k} \m.
At the end of each iteration (lines 14-16), they also set
R¯j = B¯j = J¯j = ⊥, as needed for consistently.
Overall, the above modified protocol involves only O(κn)
CG-based comparisons per clustering iteration, as opposed
to O(κn2) needed by our main protocol. As shown in Sec-
tion 7, this linear cost reduction results in significant per-
formance improvements, comprising the first of our two pro-
tocol variants that improve scalability to ease the practical
adoption of our privacy-preserving cluster analysis solution.
Protocol extensions. We now discuss various techniques,
concrete or conceptual, that can be used or considered in ex-
tending our main protocol to support a wide range of anal-
ysis formats for privacy-preserving collaborative clustering.
For simplicity, so far we have considered only one-
dimensional data (d = 1). Our protocol can be easily
adapted to handle higher-dimension data (d > 1)—in prac-
tice, the most common data format for which collabora-
tive cluster analysis becomes a vital learning tool. As its
core clustering component (sub-protocol PCA.Cluster) deals
primarily with comparisons between squared Euclidean dis-
tances and thus remains entirely unaffected by the num-
ber of dimensions, only the setup and output-computation
components of our protocol need to be modified, as follows.
Initially, P2 computes the helper information H, by repre-
senting each point not by 3 but by 3d encryptions (essen-
tially, line 4 of (Algorithm 1 runs independently for each
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A known technique in information retrieval; see [59, Section 17.2.1].
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dimension). Analogously, P1, P2 compute the square Eu-
clidian distances (lines 3 and 11-12) as the sum of squared
per-dimension differences across all dimensions, which can
be achieved efficiently over AHE-encrypted data. The shuf-
fling process remains largely unaffected, other than the fact
that lists L, S, S′ each consists of dn encryptions (instead of
n). Finally, the representative computation (line 6 in Algo-
rithm 1) is now performed over vectors of d values.
Our protocol can also be extended to also support other
distance metrics, including L1, L2 or Euclidian, and in gen-
eral any Lp distance for p ≥ 1. The only modification is com-
puting the pairwise distance matrix during setup. Whereas
our chosen squared Euclidian distance metric enables joint
computation of pairwise distances solely using AHE and
with a simple interaction between P1,P2, if other distance
metrics are considered, then the design of more elaborate
protocol components may be required in setup phase.
Security. In Appendix C, we prove the following result:
Theorem 5.1. Assuming Paillier’s encryption scheme is
semantically secure and that ArgMin and MaxDist are se-
curely realized by GC-based protocols, protocol PCA securely
realizes functionality f∗HC as per Definition 3.1.
Extensions towards maintaining security also in the mali-
cious threat model, where parties may misbehave arbitrarily,
are generally possible—though, with new design challenges
emerged. Techniques that can be applied include augment-
ing homomorphic ciphertexts with zero-knowledge proofs
and garbled circuits with cut-and-choose extensions, as well
as, recent developments in efficient secure computation [84].
Extending our protocol to support multiple participants,
as typically considered by federated learning, is our main
direction for future work. We believe that this goal is fea-
sible but would require drastically different techniques to
achieve practical performance. Techniques that may help
in this direction include replacing the garbled circuit com-
ponents with secret-sharing based protocols [8] and using
recent advancements in secure computation [51,85].
6. SCALABILITY VIA APPROXIMATION
The cryptographic machinery required for our main proto-
col imposes overhead in practice: Although it asymptotically
performs the same number of operations as those performed
by the ordinary (non-private) HC algorithm, every operation
over plaintext is now roughly replaced by a cryptographic
operation. And no matter how well-optimized their code is,
such crypto-hardened operations will ultimately be slower!
Therefore, to further scale to larger datasets, we explore a
new dimension in the design of scalable private cluster anal-
ysis, where we seek to exploit existing approximate schemes
for ordinary hierarchical clustering. In our context, approx-
imate clustering refers to performing cluster analysis over a
high-volume available dataset by carefully applying the ordi-
nary HCAlg algorithm only on a small subset of the dataset.
The effect of doing so is twofold: Cluster analysis is much
faster but only approximate, as using a minority of points
diminishes accuracy and increases the sensitivity to outliers.
In what follows, we adapt the CURE approximate cluster-
ing algorithm [42] and seamlessly integrate it to our main
protocol PCA, within a flexible design framework that offers
a variety of configurations for balancing tradeoffs between
performance and accuracy, to overall get the first variants of
CURE for private collaborative cluster analysis. Although,
The CURE approximate clustering algorithm
Input: D, n, s, p, q, t1, t2, R Output: Clusters C over D
[Sampling] Randomly pick s points in D to form sample S.
[Clustering A]
1. Partition S into p partitions Pis, each of size s/p.
2. Run HCAlg to cluster each Pi into s/(pq) target clusters.
3. Eliminate within each Pi clusters of size less than t1.
[Clustering B]
1. Run HCAlg to cluster all remaining A-clusters CA in S.
2. Eliminate clusters of size less than t2 to get B-clusters CB .
3. Set R random points in each B-cluster as its representatives.
[Classification]
1. Assign singletons in D to B-cluster of closest representative.
Figure 3: The CURE approximate clustering algorithm.
Parameters Description Value
n, s Sizes of dataset and its sample ≤ 1M, [102 : 103]
p, q # parts, cluster/part control p = 1, 3, 5, q = 3
t1, t2 A-, B-cluster outlier thresholds 3 = t1 < t2 = 5
R Representatives per B-cluster R = 1, 3, 5, 7, 10
Table 1: CURE clustering parameters and values.
in principle, our framework can be applied to any approxi-
mate clustering scheme (e.g., BIRCH [92]), we choose CURE
for its strong resilience to outliers and high accuracy (even
on samples less than 1% of original data)—features that
place it among the best options for scalable cluster analysis.
The CURE algorithm. Described in Figure 3, on input
the original dataset D of size n and a number of approx-
imation parameters, CURE first randomly samples s data
points from D to form sample set S. During A-clustering, S
is partitioned into p equally-sized parts P1,P2, . . .Pp, and
the ordinary algorithm HCAlg runs p times to form a set CA
of A-clusters: Its ith execution is on input Pi, i ∈ [1, p], un-
til exactly s/(pq) clusters are formed, of which only those of
size at least t1 are included in CA and the rest are eliminated
as outliers. During B-clustering, HCAlg runs once again, this
time over set CA, to form a set CB of B-clusters, from which
clusters of size less than t2 > t1 are eventually eliminated
as outliers. Finally, for each B-cluster in CB a number of
R random representatives are selected, and each singleton
point in D is included to the B-cluster containing its clos-
est representative. Table 1 summarizes suggested values for
each parameter as per CURE’s original description [42].
Private CURE-approximate clustering. We adapt the
CURE algorithm to design private protocols for approximate
hierarchical clustering in our model for two-party collabora-
tive cluster analysis. In applying our security formulation
of Section 3 and our private protocol design of Sections 4
and 5 to this problem instance, the following facts are vital:
1. CURE involves three main tasks: input sampling, clus-
tering of sample, and unlabeled-points classification.
2. Clustering involves p+ 1 invocations of HCAlg′, which
extends ordinary algorithm HCAlg to receive clusters
as input and compute its output over an input subset.
3. If p = 1 and OA, OB are the A- and B-outliers, then:
i. HCAlg′ first runs on S to form CA over SA , S \OA;
CA is exactly the output of HCAlg run on SA; and next
ii. HCAlg′ runs on CA to form CB over SB , S \{OA∪
OB}; CB is exactly the output of HCAlg run on SB .
Fact 1 refines our protocol-design space to only securely
realizing the clustering task, where sampling and classifi-
cation are viewed as input pre-processing and output post-
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processing of clustering. Specifically, P1, P2: (1) individually
form random input samples SP , SQ of their own datasets
P,Q; (2) compute B-clusters and their representatives (as
specified by CURE); and (3) use these B-cluster representa-
tives to individually classify their own unlabeled points.
As such, the default private realization of CURE would en-
tail having the parties perform clustering A and B jointly.
Yet, since our design space is already restricted to provide
approximate solutions, we also consider two protocol vari-
ants, where parties trade even more accuracy for efficiency,
by performing: (1) clustering A locally and only B jointly ;
and, in the extreme case (2) clustering A and B locally. We
denote these protocols by PCure2, PCure1 and PCure0.
In PCure0, P1, P2 non-collaboratively compute B-clusters
of their samples and announce the representatives selected
for each of them. Though a degenerate solution, as it in-
volves no interaction, this consideration is still useful: First,
to serve as a baseline for evaluating the other variants, but
mostly to further refine our design space. PCure0 (trivially)
preserves privacy during B-cluster computation, but violates
the privacy guarantees offered by our point-agnostic dendro-
grams, by revealing a subset of a party’s input points to the
other party. To rectify this issue, present also in PCure2 and
PCure1, we fix R = 1 and have each B-cluster be represented
by its centroid, where using average values is expected to
have no impact on accuracy, at least for spherical clusters.7
Fact 2 then ensures that B-clusters (and their centroids)
can be computed by essentially running ordinary algorithm
HCAlg, possibly with slight modifications (discussed below).
In PCure1, P1, P2 non-collaboratively compute A-clusters
of their samples, which they need to, jointly, further clus-
ter into B-clusters. Semantically, this means that they need
to run HCAlg, not starting at level n (singletons) but in-
stead at an intermediate level i, where each input A-cluster
contains at least t1 points. Our secure protocol PCA can
be used for this purpose, with one modification: At setup,
the joint state of the parties must encode their individual
A-clusters along with their pairwise linkages. Accordingly,
sub-protocol PCA.Setup is modified in two ways: (1) Lines 3
and 11 now compute inter-cluster distances (of same-party
pairs) using the specified linkage function; and (2) lines 2
and 12 are now used as a subroutine to compute all point dis-
tances across a given A-cluster pair, over which inter-cluster
linkages (of cross-party pairs) are evaluated using our secure-
comparison GC-protocol ArgMin. Note that the running
time of our modified PCA.Setup is O(λs2), as O(s2) pair-
wise distances are computed across O(s) A-cluster points.
In PCure2, P1, P2 jointly compute A- and B-clusters over
their samples, which introduces the technical challenge of
how to transition from clustering A to B. Simply running
p copies of HCAlg in parallel to compute A-clusters, is in-
adequate to provide the cluster linkages that are necessary
for HCAlg to run and compute B-clusters. Possible solu-
tions entail either treating A-clusters as singletons, which
can drastically impair accuracy, or running an intermedi-
ate secure MPC protocol to bootstrap HCAlg with cluster
linkages, which can impair performance. Instead, we take
the simpler approach to fix p = 1, allowing us to seamlessly
use the final joint state of clustering A as initial joint state
for clustering B. Here, missing possible speedups by paral-
lel processing is by far compensated by avoiding a costly
7
R > 1 is only used to improve accuracy of non-spherical clusters [42].
bootstrap-protocol execution, in fact at no loss in accuracy,
as our experimental evaluation clearly confirms.8
Finally, the security of protocols PCure1 and PCure2 can
be reduced to that of protocol PCA. Our modular design
and facts 2 and 3, ensure that security in our private CURE-
approximate clustering is captured by our ideal functional-
ity f∗HC of Section 3: The intended two-party computation
merely involves computing B-cluster representatives, which
f∗HC provides, and any input/output modification in HCAlg
relates to a trivial change to the pre-/post-processing com-
ponent of f∗HC that remains consistent to our point-agnostic
dendrograms. Using standard arguments for secure com-
position of MPC protocols [67], the security of PCure1 and
PCure2 can be readily reduced to the security of PCA.
7. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We next summarize results on the efficacy of protocol PCA
and its variants, obtained via a comprehensive experimen-
tal analysis on a prototype system implementation of our
presented solutions for two-party private cluster analysis.
Framework. In addition to analysing performance (mea-
sured as running time and consumed bandwidth), in order to
meaningfully evaluate the efficacy of our approximate pro-
tocol variants, we also study the tradeoffs between accu-
racy and performance that they naturally exhibit, using the
standard methodology for determining clustering accuracy.
Specifically, we employ datasets that include ground-truth
labels, i.e., each data point is labelled with its correct class.
Run on such a labeled dataset, a clustering protocol is said
to classify (all points in) an output cluster into the majority
correct class of its contained points; then, the accuracy of
the protocol is defined as the fraction of input points that
are clustered into their correct class relative to ground truth.
Thus, to fully test our protocols in realistic big-data
clustering scenarios, we ideally need access to real-world
datasets that are both labeled and of high volume (e.g., at
the order of million records). Unfortunately, we are unable
to find or get access to such datasets, so we experiment with
labeled real-world datasets of moderate size and large-scale
artificial datasets, the best available alternatives. Fortu-
nately, the nature of our evaluation goals and our protocol
properties give us confidence to posit that scalability can
be sufficiently studied even using solely synthetic datasets.
Indeed, very similar results are expected also for real large-
scale data, since our protocol performance depends mainly
on the dataset size, varying very little with data dimension,
as our experiments confirm, and being invariant to actual
data values, as the type or order of cryptographic operations
is data independent. Besides, as discussed initially, accuracy
naturally increases with the dataset size and variety.
Accordingly, we employ four real-world datasets, available
in the UCI ML Repository [3], which are restricted to con-
tain only numeric attributes; namely: (1) The Iris dataset
for iris plants classification (150 instances, 4 attributes); (2)
the Wine dataset for chemical analysis of wines (178 records,
13 attributes); (3) the Heart dataset for heart disease diag-
nosis (303 records, 20 attributes); and (4) the Cancer dataset
for breast cancer diagnostics (569 records, 30 attributes).
We randomly generate a set of synthetic d-dimensional
datasets of various sizes up to 1M records and d ∈ [1, 20],
using a Gaussian mixture distribution, as follows: (1) The
8
Partitioning, p > 1, is only suggested to exploit parallelism [42].
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(a) Computation cost of PCA. (b) Computation cost of OPT.
(c) Communication cost of PCA. (d) Communication cost of OPT.
(e) Real-data performance of PCA. (f) Real-data performance of OPT.
Figure 4: Performance of PCA (left) Vs. OPT (right).
number of clusters (classes) is randomly chosen in [8 : 15];
(2) Each cluster center is randomly chosen in [−50, 50]d,9
subject to an imposed minimum-separation distance be-
tween any pair of them; (3) Standard deviation of the clus-
ters randomly chosen in [0.5, 4]; and (4) Outliers are selected
uniformly at random in the same interval as above and as-
signed randomly to clusters so as to emulate three noise
percentage scenarios: low 0.1%, medium 1%, and high 5%.
To evaluate performance in our two-party collaborative
setting, we randomly split each used dataset and each party
gets half the total number of records as its input points.
Also, we set the desired number of clusters to `t = 5; as our
protocol incurs costs linear in the number of iterations (n−
`t), this value selection comprises a worst-case evaluation
setting, as in practice more than 5 target clusters are desired.
Finally, cryptographic protocols are implemented in C++,
using the ABY framework [23] and security parameters that
are standard in this framework; namely, we set the symmet-
ric and public-key security parameters to 128 and 1024 (for
AES encryption in garbled circuits and homomorphic en-
cryption, respectively), and the statistical security param-
eter κ to 40 (for blinding terms). We use the code from
libpaillier [1] for Paillier encryption. We run our experi-
ments on two 24-core machines (one for each party), running
Scientific Linux with 128GB memory on 2.9GHz Intel Xeon
and connected in a university LAN with small RTT.
9
Performance is dominated by parameter κ but not exact data values.
Protocol PCA. We first report results on the performance
of our main privacy-preserving protocol PCA of Section 4.
Figures 4a and 4c show the computational and commu-
nication costs for synthetic datasets of various sizes and di-
mensions, averaged over single and complete linkages. First,
consistently with our analysis in Section 5, we observe that
the dimension has minimal impact on the former and no
impact at all for the latter, since PCA’s performance relates
primarily to computing inter-cluster distances that is mini-
mally affected by d. As expected by PCA’s cubic asymptotic
complexity, both costs increase steeply with dataset size n.
Yet, as shown in Figure 4e, for our small-size real datasets
bandwidth overhead is less than 100MB and running time
is under 4min, which may be reasonable in practice.
Protocol OPT. We next report results on the performance
of our optimized single-linkage variant OPT of Section 5.
Figures 4b and 4d show the computational and commu-
nication costs on synthetic datasets (in execution configu-
rations identical to those used to test PCA). In line with
our analysis in Section 5, protocol OPT significantly im-
proves performance, by reducing both cost components by
an order of magnitude. For instance, for datasets of 2000
20-dimensional points, the running time is approximately
230 secs, an 8× speedup compared to PCA, and the band-
width overhead decreases from 9GB to 26MB, an almost
400× improvement! The difference in the exact magnitudes
of improvement between computation and communication
costs, in our above example, is explained by the following
observations: (1) although OPT improves performance dur-
ing clustering by a linear factor, it adds costs during setup;
and (2) the involved constants of the two quadratic costs are
higher for running time and lower for bandwidth overhead
in setup phase, and vice versa in clustering phase.
As expected and shown in Figure 4f, OPT significantly
improves performance over PCA, also when tested over our
real datasets. For instance, for Cancer, running time is un-
der 35sec using bandwidth of less than 2.5MB.
Protocols PCure∗. We finally report results on the accu-
racy and performance of our CURE variants of Section 6.
Figure 5 shows the accuracy of protocols PCure0, PCure1,
PCure2 and the non-private CURE algorithm on synthetic
datasets of 1M records for sample sizes between 102 and 103,
partition parameters p = 1 and p = 5, and for low (0.1%),
medium (1%), and high (5%) outliers-to-data percentages.
Variant PCure0 generally exhibits poor accuracy. By run-
ning CURE completely separately, on their own samples and
without interaction during the protocol other than announc-
ing representatives for clusters they individually computed,
parties avoid any cryptographic overheads but at significant
loss in accuracy, e.g., by 44.4% for 1M records.
For p = 1, PCure1 and PCure2 generally achieve similar
accuracy, which closely approaches the accuracy to CURE for
sufficiently large samples: At 300 samples or higher, their
achieved accuracy is within 3% of CURE. For higher values
of p, e.g., p = 5, PCure1 and PCure2 exhibit a difference
in accuracy: For instance, at 200 samples the accuracy for
PCure1 is lower by 39.54% than that of PCure2; but at 500
samples or more, their achieved accuracies are within 3.18%.
Moreover, experimenting with all combinations of p =
1, 3, 5 partitions and R = 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 representatives shows
that the accuracies of PCure2 and PCure1 are very close to
CURE at s = 1000 samples (or more). The largest observed
difference between PCure1 and CURE is 3.57%, and between
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Figure 5: Accuracy of CURE, PCure∗: p = 1 (left), p = 5
(right), #outliers = 0.1% (top), 1% (middle), 5% (bottom).
PCure2 and CURE is 2.7%. For p = 1 and R = 1 either
difference is less than 1% at 1000 samples (or more). Thus,
our choice of p = 1 and R = 1 to protect data privacy, as
argued in Section 6, does not impact the protocol’s accuracy.
Overall, PCure1 appears to be the preferred variant for
two-party private approximate clustering when large enough
samples are used, as it achieves accuracy close to the orig-
inal CURE approach but incurs lower overheads than other
variants, without any privacy loss for our chosen parameters.
We conclude the section with an end-to-end evaluation of
PCure1 and PCure2, which confirms that our private approx-
imation protocols can be scaled to datasets in the order of
millions records. We consider optimized versions of PCure1
and PCure2, where CURE is implemented using our opti-
mized protocol OPT, and we select n = 106 10-dimensional
records with 1% outliers, no sample partitioning (p = 1),
`t = 5 target clusters and q = 3 control of clustering A.
Figure 6 shows that the overall performance of PCure1
and PCure2, for sample sizes s ∈ [400 : 1000], is practical.
For example, for 103 samples, PCure2 runs in 104sec using
6.5MB, while PCure1 runs in 35sec using 896KB—i.e., more
than 3× faster and using 7.25× less bandwidth than PCure2,
but at a similar accuracy level (97.09%). We stress that in
our end-to-end evaluation, the effect of network latency on
running time is negligible, since OPT consumes little band-
width so most of running time is spent on crypto operations.
8. RELATEDWORK
The risks of information leakage in supervised learn-
ing has been demonstrated by practical attacks that in-
fer private information about the training data or the ML
model and its hyper-parameters [34, 45, 76]. A large body
of work exists on techniques that mitigate such attacks
against supervised learning, including work on privacy pro-
tections for classification models (such as decision trees [57],
Figure 6: End-to-end performance of PCure1, PCure2.
SVM classification [83], linear regression [26, 27, 73], logis-
tic regression [33] and neural networks [11, 65, 72]), work
on privacy-preserving federated learning [14], and work
on preventing leakage in supervised learning via MPC-
based protocols provable secure in concrete threat models
(e.g., [7,15,18,19,35,37,38,44,50,54,58,60,63,69,71]). Yet,
most works on private supervised learning achieve scalabil-
ity in a weaker security setting, where an ML model is first
trained over large-volume plaintext datasets (outside of the
threat model) to only later predict low-volume test data in
privacy-preserving ways via efficient crypto back-ends.
A smaller body of work focuses on private unsupervised
learning, studying primarily k-means clustering (e.g., [16,
25,30,48,49,82]) but only partially the problem of privacy-
preserving hierarchical clustering, as prior works on this
topic either lack formal security definitions and proofs [22,
46, 47] and/or implementations [74], or they lack generality
with techniques tailored only for document clustering [80].
An entirely different approach, applicable to both learn-
ing types, seeks to preserve privacy via data perturbation
(e.g., [4,20,21,64,75,77]), by adding statistical noise to hide
exact data values (e.g., differential privacy [28]). Such tech-
niques are orthogonal to ours and can potentially be applied
in unison towards a possibly more robust security treatment.
Finally, the interplay between cryptographic protocols
and efficient approximations [32] has offered optimized pro-
tocols for problems such as pattern matching in genomic
data [9,86], k-means [79], and logistic regression [81,88]. To
the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to compose
secure cryptographic protocols with efficient approximation
algorithms for scalable private hierarchical clustering.
9. CONCLUSION
We address the problem of privacy-preserving hierarchical
clustering. We propose for the first time a formal security
definition in the framework of secure computation. We de-
sign a secure clustering protocol that satisfies the definition
for single and complete linkage, as well as an optimized ver-
sion for the former. We combine our protocols with efficient
approximate clustering in order to achieve the best of both
worlds: strong security guarantees and scalability. Finally,
we experimentally evaluate our protocol and show that it is
efficient and scalable to one million records.
We believe this work opens up new avenues of research in
privacy-preserving unsupervised learning, including the se-
cure protocol design for private hierarchical clustering using
other linkage types (e.g., Ward) or alternative approxima-
tion frameworks (e.g., BIRCH [92]), or altogether exploring
new constructions for other learning tasks (e.g., related to
mixture models, association rules, and graph learning). Spe-
cific to our results, interesting and challenging avenues for
future work include efficiently extending our protocols to the
malicious threat model and multiple-party setting.
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APPENDIX
A. GARBLED CIRCUITS
Garbled circuits (GC) [90,91] provide a general framework
for securely realizing two-party computation of any function-
ality. The framework has been thoroughly studied in the
literature (e.g., see formal treatments of the topic [13, 56])
and we here overview the specific procedures involved in it.
In our running example, parties P1 and P2 wish to evaluate
a specific function f over their respective inputs x1, x2 and
engage in an interactive 2-phase protocol, where one party
plays the role of the garbler and the other the role of the
evaluator. Without loss of generality, P1 is the garbler and
P2 is the evaluator, and their interaction proceeds as follows.
In phase I, P1 expresses f as a Boolean circuit Cf , i.e., as
a directed acyclic graph of Boolean AND and OR gates, and
then sends a “garbled,” i.e., encrypted, version of Cf to P2.
In our example, Cf corresponds to a circuit of two AND
gates A,B and an OR gate C, shown in Figure 7: Inputs x1,
x2 are 11 and 01, and output f(x1, x2) is 1, computed by
feeding to the OR gate the two bitwise ANDs of the inputs.
Figure 7: Garbled circuit Cf of a specific function f that
computes the OR over the pairwise ANDs of the 2-bit inputs.
To garble Cf , P1 first maps (the two possible bits 0, 1 of)
each wire X in Cf to two random values w0X , w1X (from a
large domain, e.g., {0, 1}128), called the garbled values of X.
Specifically, P1 maps the output wires of gates A,
B, and C to random garbled values {w0A, w1A}, {w0B , w1B}
and respectively {w0C , w1C}, and also maps the two in-
put wires of gate A (respectively, gate B) to ran-
dom garbled values {w011, w111}, {w021, w121} (respectively,
{w012, w112}, {w022, w122}), where mnemonically the i-th input
bit of party Pj corresponds to the ij-wire, i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Next, P1 sends to P2 the garbled truth table of every
Boolean gate in Cf , which is the permuted encrypted truth
table of the gate, where row in the truth table is appro-
priately encrypted using the garbled values of its three as-
sociated wires. We only specify the garbled truth table of
the AND gate A, as other gates can be handled similarly.
The row (1, 1)→ 1 in the truth table of A dictates that the
output is 1 when input is 1, 1 or, using garbled values, that
the output is w1A when input is w
1
11, w
1
21. Accordingly, using
a semantically-secure symmetric encryption scheme Ek(·)
(e.g., 128-bit AES), P1 can express this condition as cipher-
text Ew111
(Ew121
(w1A)), where the output w
1
A is successively
encrypted using the inputs w111, w
1
21 as encryption keys. P1
produces a similar ciphetext for each other row in the truth
table of A and sends them to P2, permuted to hide the order
of the rows. Observe that one can retrieve w1A if and only
if they possess both w111, w
1
21, and that if one possesses only
w111, w
1
21, all other entries of the garbled truth table of A
(besides w1A) are indistinguishable from random, due to the
semantic security of the encryption scheme Ek(·).
Finally, to allow P2 to retrieve the final output f(x1, x2),
P1 also sends the garbled values w
0
C , w
1
C of the output wire
together with their corresponding mapping to 0 and 1. Note
that P2 is no privy to any other mappings between wires’
garbled values and their possible bit values.
In phase II, P2 evaluates the entire circuit Cf over the
received garbled truth tables of the gates in it, by evaluating
gates one by one in the ordering hierarchy induced by (the
DAG structure of) Cf . Indeed, if P2 knows the w value of
each input wire of a gate and its garbled truth table, P2 can
easily discover its output value, by attempting to decrypt
all rows in the table and accepting only the one that returns
a correct output value. For example, if P2 has w
1
11, w
0
21, P2
can try to decrypt every value in the garbled truth table of
A, until P2 finds the correct value w
1
A.
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To initiate this circuit-evaluation process, P2 needs to
learn the garbled values of each of the input wires in Cf ,
which is achieved as follows: (1) P1 sends to P2 the w values
w111, w
1
12 corresponding to the input wires of P1 in the clear
(note that since these are random values, P2 cannot map
them to 0 or 1, thus P1’s input is protected); (2) P2 pri-
vately query from P1 the w values w
0
21, w
1
22 corresponding
to the input wires of P2, that is, without P1 learning which
garbled values were queried, via a two-party secure compu-
tation protocol called 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) [68].
At a very high level, and focusing on a single input bit, OT
allows P2 to retrieve from P1 exactly one value in pair (w
0
21,
w121) without P1 learning which value was retrieved. After
running the OT protocol for every input bit, P2 can evalu-
ate Cf , as above, to finally compute and send back to P1 the
correct output f(x1, x2) = 1, deduced by the final garbled
value w1C of the output wire.
B. SECURE min-SELECTION PROTOCOLS
Here, we overview the design of GC-based proto-
cols ArgMin and MaxDist/MinDist for secure selection of
min/max values, or their index/location, over secret-shared
data. These protocols have been defined in Sections 4 and 5
and comprise integral components of our solutions. We pro-
vide the exact two circuits over which we can directly ap-
ply the garbled-circuits framework (see Appendix A) to get
GC-protocols ArgMin and MinDist, noting that the circuit
in support of MaxDist is similar to the case of MinDist.
Recall that data consists of λ-bit values and is secret
shared among the two parties as κ-bit random blinding
terms, κ > λ, and κ+ 1-bit blinded values, each resulted by
adding a random blinding term to an ordinary data value.
Our circuits use as building blocks the following gates,
efficient implementations of which are well studied [53]:
10
For this, we need to assume that the encryption scheme allows detec-
tion of well-formed decryptions, i.e., it is possible to deduce whether
the retrieved plaintext has a correct format. This can be easily
achieved using a blockcipher and padding with a sufficient number
of 0’s, in which case well-formed decryptions will have a long suffix of
0’s and decryptions under the wrong key will have a suffix of random
bits. This property is referred to as verifiable range in [56].
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• ADD/SUB that adds/subtracts κ+ 1-bit integers;
• MIN/MAX that selects the min/max of two λ-bit in-
tegers, using a one-bit output to encode which input
value is the min/max value (e.g., on input 3, 5 MIN
outputs 0 to indicate the first value is smaller);
• a multiplexer gate MUXi that on input two i-bit inputs
and a selector bit s, outputs the first or the second one,
depending on the value of s; and finally
• hard-coded in the circuit constant gates CONi, 1 ≤
i ≤ n, that always output the (logn)-bit fixed value i
(e.g., CON3 outputs the binary representation of 3).
SUB SUB
MIN
MUX 
MUXlogn
CON1 CON2
SUB
MUXlogn
MIN
MUX 
CON3
MUXlogn
SUB
MIN
MUX 
CONn
· · ·· · ·
· · ·v1 r1 r2v2 vn rnv3 r3
Figure 8: The circuit for protocol ArgMin.
Figure 8 shows the circuit of protocol ArgMin for selecting
the index of the minimum value in an array of n different
values. On input n κ + 1-bit values v1, . . . , vn and n κ-bit
blinding terms r1, . . . , rn, the circuit first uses n SUB gates
to compute (the secret) values vi − ri, i = 1, . . . , n, and
then selects the index of the minimum such value in n − 1
successive comparisons as follows. In the ith comparison, a
MIN gate compares the currently minimum valuemi of index
loci (initially, m1 = v1 − r1, loc1 = 1) to value vi+1 − ri+1
of index i + 1, and its output bit is fed, as the selector bit,
to two multiplexer gates MUXµ:
• µ = log n: once for selecting among two (logn)-bit
indices loci and i+ 1, the latter conveniently encoded
as the output of constant gate CONi+1 (such hard-
coded indices significantly facilitate their propagation
in the circuit, compared to the alternative of handling
indexes as input and carrying them over throughout
the circuit); and
• µ = λ: once for selecting among two λ-bit values mi
and vi+1 − ri+1,
overall propagating the updated minimum value mi+1 =
min{a, b} and its index loci+1 to the next (i+ 1)th compar-
ison. The final output (see arrow wire) corresponds to the
output of the (n− 1)th index-selection multiplexer gate.
SUB
u vr1 r2 r
0
SUB
MIN
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Figure 9: The circuit for protocol MinDist.
Figure 9 shows the circuit for protocol MinDist for select-
ing and re-blinding the minimum value among two secret-
shared values. On input two κ+1-bit blinded values u, v and
three κ-bit blinding terms r1, r2, r
′, the circuit first computes
u− r1, v− r2 using two SUB gates, then computes the min-
imum of these two values using a MIN gate, and its output
bit is fed, as the selector bit, to a multiplexer gate MUXλ
for selecting the minimum among two λ-bit values u − r1
and v − r2, which is becomes the final output (see arrow
wire) after it is blinded by adding the input blinding term
r′ through a ADD gate. (The circuit for protocol MaxDist is
the same with a MAX gate replacing the MIN gate.)
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
We begin by recalling that, under the assumption that
the oblivious transfer protocol used is secure, there exists
simulator SimOT that can simulate the views of each of the
parties P1,P2 during a single oblivious transfer execution
when given as input the corresponding party’s input (and
output, in case it is non-empty) and randomness.
The core idea behind our proof is that, since all values
seen by the two parties during the protocol execution (apart
from the indexes of the merged clusters at each round) are
“blinded” by large random factors, these values can be per-
fectly simulated, as needed in our proof, by randomly se-
lected values. For example, assuming all values pi, qi are
32-bits and the chosen random values are 100-bits, it fol-
lows that the sum of the two is statistically indistinguishable
from a 100-bit value chosen uniformly at random. In partic-
ular, this allows the simulator to effectively run the protocol
with the adversary by simply choosing simulated values for
the other party which he chooses himsellf at random (in the
above example these would be random 32-bit values).
We handle the two cases of party corruption separately.
Corruption of P2. The view of P2 during the protocol
execution consists of:
1. Encrypted matrices B,R and encrypted arrays L, S.
2. For each round of clustering `, messages received dur-
ing the oblivious transfer execution for ArgMin, de-
noted by OT` and the min/max index α`.
3. During each round of clustering `, for each execution
of MinDist/MaxDist for index k, messages received dur-
ing the corresponding oblivious transfer execution, de-
noted by OT`,k, corresponding garbled circuit GC`,k,
and output value v`,k.
4. Encrypted cluster representative values E1, . . . , E`t .
The simulator SimP2 , on input the random tape R2, points
q1, . . . , qn2 , outputs (rep1/|J1|, |J1|, . . . , rep`t/|J`t |, |J`t |),
α1, . . . , α`t , computes the view of P2 as follows.
• (Ciphertext computation) Using random tape R2,
the simulator runs the key generation algorithm for P2
to receive sk′, pk′. He then chooses values p′1, . . . , p
′
n1
uniformly at random from {0, 1}d. These will act as
the “simulated” values for player P1. He then runs
protocol PCA honestly using the values p′i as input for
P1 (and the actual values qi of P2), with the following
modifications.
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for OT`) For ` =
1, . . . , `t let W` be the set of garbled input values
computed by P2 for the garbled circuit that evaluates
MinDist/MaxDist at round `. Since we are in the semi-
honest setting, the corrupted P2 computes these val-
ues uniformly at random. Therefore, the simulator can
also compute them using R2. Then, for i = 1, . . . , `,
the simulator includes in the view (instead of OT`)
the output OT ′` produced by simulator Sim
(2)
OT on in-
put W`.
11 Note that P2 does not receive any output
11
And corresponding randomness derived from R2.
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from this oblivious transfer execution, thus Sim
(2)
OT only
works given the input.
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for Argmin) For
each round `, the simulator includes in the view, the
index α`.
• (Garbled circuit simulation for GC`,k) Next, the
simulator needs to compute the garbled circuits GC`,k.
The simulator uses the corresponding values from R
(as computed so far) and a “new” blinding factor ρ`,k
for P1’ inputs and computes a garbled circuit for eval-
uating ArgMin honestly. The simulator also includes in
the view of P2 the garbled inputs for the corresponding
elements from R.
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for OT`,k) Let y`,k
be the input of P2 for the circuit GC`,k (i.e., the ex-
ecution of ArgMin for index k during round `). Since
we are in the semi-honest case, the corrupted P2 will
provide as input the values that have been established
from the interaction with P1 (using the points p
′
i) up
to that point, therefore y`,k can be computed by the
simulator. In order to compute the parts of the view
that correspond to each of OT`,k the simulator includes
in the view the output of SimOT on input y`,k and the
corresponding choice from each pair of garbled inputs
he chose in the previous step (as dictated by the bit
representation of y`,k), which we denote as OT
′
`,k.
• (Encrypted representatives computation) For
` = 1, . . . , `t, the simulator computes rep` =
drep`/|J`| · |Ji|e and E` = [rep`], where encryption
is under (the previously computed) pk.
We now argue that the view produced by our simulator is
indistinguishable from the view of P2 when interacting with
P1 running PCA. This is done via the following sequence of
hybrids.
Hybrid 0. This is the view viewAPCA
P2
, i.e., the view of P2
when interacting with P1 running PCA for points pi.
Hybrid 1. This is the same as Hybrid 0, but the output
of GC` in viewAPCA
P2
is replaced by α`. This is indistinguish-
able from Hybrid 0 due to the correctness of the garbling
scheme. Since we are in the semi-honest setting, both par-
ties follow the protocol, therefore the outputs they evaluate
are always α`.
Hybrid 2. This is the same as Hybrid 1, but values in B,L
are computed using values p′i. This is statistically indistin-
guishable from Hybrid 1 (i.e., even unbounded algorithms
can only distinguish between the two with probability O(2κ)
since in viewAPCA
P2
, each of the values in B,L are computed
as the sum of a random value from {0, 1}κ and a distance
between two clusters.
Hybrid 3. This is the same as Hybrid 2, but all values in
R,S are replaced with encryptions of zero’s. This is indis-
tinguishable from Hybrid 2 due to the semantic security of
Paillier’s encryption scheme.
Hybrid 4. This is the same as Hybrid 3, but each of OT`
is replaced by OT ′` , computed as described above. This is
indistinguishable from Hybrid 3 due to the security of the
oblivious transfer protocol.
Hybrid 5. This is the same as Hybrid 4, but the garbled
inputs given to P2 for GC`,k are chosen based on the values
that have been computed using values p′i. Since garbled
inputs are chosen uniformly at random (irrespectively of the
actual input values), this follows the same distribution as
Hybrid 3.
Hybrid 6. This is the same as Hybrid 5, but each of OT`,k
is replaced by output of OT`,k computed as described above.
This is indistinguishable from Hybrid 5 due to the security
of the oblivious transfer protocol.
Hybrid 7. This is the same as Hybrid 6, but each value Ei
sens to P2 is computed as [drepi/|Ji| · |Ji|e] using public key
pk′. This is indistinguishable from Hybrid 6 since we are in
the semi-honest setting and both parties follow the protocol
therefore the outputs they evaluate are always repi/|Ji|.
Note that Hybrid 7 corresponds to the view produced by
our simulator and Hybrid 0 to the view that P2 receives
while interacting with P1 during piHC which concludes this
part of the proof.
Corruption of P1. The case where P1 is corrupted is some-
what simpler as he does not receive any outputs from the
circuits GC`,k. The view of P1 during the protocol execution
consists of:
1. Encrypted tables D,R and encrypted arrays H,L, S.
2. For each round of clustering `, a garbled circuit GC`
for evaluating ArgMin, messages received during the
corresponding oblivious transfer execution denoted by
OT`.
3. During each round of clustering `, for each execution of
MinDist/MaxDist for index k, messages received during
the corresponding oblivious transfer execution denoted
by OT`,k.
The simulator SimP1 , on input the random tape R1, points
p1, . . . , pn1 , outputs (rep1/|J1|, |J1|, . . . , rep`t/|J`t |, |J`t |),
α1, . . . , α`t , computes the view of P1 as follows.
• (Ciphertext computation) Using random tape R1,
the simulator runs the key generation algorithm for P1
to receive sk, pk and computes a pair sk′, pk′ for him-
self. He computes D,H,L consisting of encryptions of
zeros under pk′. Moreover, he computes R,S consist-
ing of encryption of values chosen uniformly at random
from {0, 1}κ and encrypted under pk.
• (Garbled circuit simulation for GC`) Next the
simulator needs to provide garbled circuits for the eval-
uation of ArgMin for each round of clustering `. For
this, the simulator creates a “rigged” garbled circuit
GC′` that always outputs α`, irrespectively of the in-
puts. This is achieved by forcing all intermediate gates
to always return the same garbled output and by set-
ting the output translation temple to always to de-
code to the bit-representation of α` (this process is
explained formally in [56]).
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for ArgMin) Let
W
(1)
` , W
(2)
` be the sets of pairs of input garbled val-
ues that the simulator choses while creating GC′` as
described above (where the former corresponds to the
input of P1 and the latter to the input of P2). The
simulator includes in the view a random choice from
each pair in W (2). Moreover, he replaces the messages
in the view that correspond to the execution of OT`,k,
by the output of Sim
(1)
OT on input (y`,W
(1)
` ), where y`
is the bit description of the input of P1 for GC` (which
can be computed with the simulator since he has access
to pi, R1).
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for
MinDist/MaxDist) For each GC`,k let W`,k be
the set of garbled input values computed by P1 for
the garbled circuit that evaluates MinDist/MaxDist at
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round ` and cluster k. Since we are in the semi-honest
setting, the corrupted P1 computes these values
uniformly at random. Therefore, the simulator can
also compute them using random tape R1. Then, for
each `, k the simulator includes in the view (instead
of OT`,k) the output OT
′
`,k produced by simulator
Sim
(1)
OT on input W`,k (and corresponding randomness
derived from R1). Note that P1 does not receive any
output from this oblivious transfer execution, thus
Sim
(1)
OT only works given the input.
We now argue that the view produced by our simulator is
indistinguishable from the view of P1 when interacting with
P2 running PCA. This is done via the following sequence of
hybrids.
Hybrid 0. This is the view viewAPCA
P1
, i.e., the view of P1
when interacting with P2 running piHC for points qi.
Hybrid 1. This is the same as Hybrid 0, but all values
in D,H ′, L are replaced with encryptions of zero’s. This is
indistinguishable from Hybrid 1 due to the semantic security
of Paillier’s encryption scheme.
Hybrid 2. This is the same as Hybrid 1, but values in
R,S are computed as encryptions of values chosen uniformly
at random from {0, 1}κ under key pk. This is statistically
indistinguishable from Hybrid 1 for the same reasons as for
the case of P2 above.
Hybrid 3. This is the same as Hybrid 2, but each of GC`
is replaced by GC′`, computed as described above (including
the values from W(2)) This is indistinguishable from Hybrid
2 due to the security of encryption scheme used for the gar-
bling scheme (this is formally described in [56]).
Hybrid 4. This is the same as Hybrid 3, but each of OT`
is replaced by OT ′` , computed as described above. This is
indistinguishable from Hybrid 3 due to the security of the
oblivious transfer protocol.
Hybrid 5. This is the same as Hybrid 4, but each of OT`,k
is replaced by OT ′`,k computed as described above. This is
again indistinguishable from Hybrid 5 due to the security of
the oblivious transfer protocol.
Note that Hybrid 5 corresponds to the view produced by
our simulator and Hybrid 0 to the view that P2 receives
while interacting with P1 during PCA which concludes this
part of the proof.
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